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We provide a theoretical and empirical study of the relation between financial development and the size of the 
underground economy. In our theoretical framework agents allocate investment between a low-return technology 
which can be operated with internal funds, and a high-return technology which requires external finance. Firms 
can reduce the cost of funding by disclosing part or all of their assets and pledging them as collateral. The 
disclosure decision, however, also involves higher tax payments and reduces tax evasion. We show that financial 
development (a reduction in the cost of external finance) can reduce tax evasion and the size of the underground 
economy. We test the main implications of the model using Italian microeconomic data that allow us to construct a 
micro-based index of the underground economy. In line with the model’s predictions, we find that local financial 
development is associated with a smaller size of the underground economy, controlling for the potential 
endogeneity of financial development and other determinants of the underground economy.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent estimates indicate that the underground economy represents 10-15% of GDP in 
developed countries and 30-40% in developing countries. In some countries, such as Panama and 
Bolivia, almost 70% of GDP is hidden (Schneider, 2007). Apart from ethical and political 
concerns, a large share of underground economy is a serious issue for governments and policy 
makers since it distorts investments, exacerbates income inequality, and hampers growth.
1 
Because of the burden of the underground economy, economists have tried to determine 
its causes and implications. However, despite a large body of literature, many aspects remain 
obscure. It is not easy to provide in-depth and exhaustive explanations for why firms and 
individuals evade taxes or operate irregularly and underground. High levels of taxation, 
cumbersome legislation, and a tight regulatory system, often considered to be the main 
determinants of an extensive underground economy, are only part of the story;
2 There are other 
factors that play a role. One of this is the institutional setting of the labor market. Social security 
contributions are a cost for both employees and employers. Hence, high social security 
contribution rates increase the incentive to hide labor. At the same time, stringent labor 
regulation, excessive bureaucracy, and impediments and obstacles to the management of human 
resources can affect the size of the underground economy. Poor contract enforcement, judicial 
inefficiency, complexity, and arbitrary regulation also reduce the incentive for firms and 
individuals to reveal their real revenues and income.
3 
Among the factors that have been linked to an underground economy, the level of financial 
development is generally not considered. Access to credit and financial services is vital for both 
firms and individuals. In affecting the extent and depth of financial services and the cost of 
credit, financial development affects real resource allocation. In this paper we study how the 
choice to operate underground (and to what extent) interacts with financial development. The 
starting point of our analysis is that the ability to reveal and signal revenues reduces information 
frictions and the cost of credit. When firms or individuals operate underground their ability to 
signal revenues and assets is lower, and the cost of credit increases. Therefore, by operating 
underground, firms and individuals face the opportunity cost of not being able to access credit. 
                                                 
1 The underground economy encompasses many activities. Many are legal, many others are criminal and illegal. The 
extent and variety of these activities is vast. In this paper we refer only to activities that per se are legal, but which are 
hidden to official statistics and authorities. We use the terms underground, informal, unofficial more or less 
synonymously.  
2 See Schneider (2005), Enste and Schneider (2000), and Johnson et al. (1998a; 1998b). 
3 See Friedman et al. (2000), Johnson et al. (1998a; 1998b), Loyaza (1996), and Enste and Schneider  (2000).   8
The more extensive their underground business, the more difficult it will be to obtain external 
finance. Financial development affects the level of underground activity by reducing the cost of 
access to credit. As financial markets develop, more efficient intermediaries enter the market, 
saving increases, and interest rates fall, increasing the opportunity cost of continuing to operate 
underground. In short, financial market development is negatively correlated with the size of the 
underground economy.  
To clarify our arguments, we propose a simple theoretical model in which agents choose 
between a low-return technology and a more advanced and rewarding technology. Investing in 
the low-return technology does not require a loan, while the high-return technology requires 
external funding. We posit that firms can reduce the cost of credit by pledging more collateral, as 
in Jappelli et al. (2005). Since contracts are not completely enforceable, part of the pledged 
resources can be lost in the case of a dispute, for example, because of judicial costs and 
inefficiencies. Pledging more collateral, however, is costly because firms must disclose their 
revenues and assets to the financial intermediaries and also to the tax officials. Hence, agents 
choose how much to invest in the two technologies by trading off the reduced financial cost of 
supplying more collateral against the benefit of hiding revenues and operating with the low-return 
technology. The choice between the two technologies therefore is also a choice between the 
underground and the official economy. Financial development reduces the cost of credit and the 
incentives to operate underground, while making it more profitable to reveal the revenues from 
high-tech projects. 
The idea that financial development can affect the underground economy has been 
explored in several papers. Straub (2005) develops a model in which firms choose between 
formality and informality. Being formal involves higher entry costs but lower punitive penalties 
for defaulting and lower financial costs since hidden incomes cannot be used as collateral. In 
Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) entrepreneurs choose between a formal and an informal sector by 
trading off higher entry costs and tax obligations in the formal sector against higher financial 
costs in the informal sector. In Blackburn et al. (2010) entrepreneurs need external resources for 
investment and can reduce the level of information costs and the financial outlays by supplying 
more collateral. Supplying more collateral, however, involves a higher tax burden. Given the 
financial costs, entrepreneurs choose whether or not to evade tax and to operate underground. 
Ellul et al. (2011) suggest that when firms choose accounting transparency, they trade off the 
benefits of access to more abundant and cheaper capital against the cost of a higher tax burden,   9
and study this trade-off in a model with distortionary taxes and endogenous rationing of external 
finance.
4 
Our model adds two important insights to the existing work. First, we take explicit account 
of the technological choice that is involved when entrepreneurs choose to operate underground. 
There is compelling evidence that the underground economy thrives in mature and non-
competitive sectors, and that underground firms do not innovate, operate on a small scale, and 
implement low-return technologies.
5 In our model the choice to operate in the underground 
economy is driven by technological reasons, and the model implies that high-tech firms operate 
in the formal economy, while low-tech firms operate underground. Second, in our model agents 
can operate simultaneously in both sectors, because they choose the optimal levels of income and 
assets to disclose to the tax authorities. This is in line with empirical evidence showing that firms 
and individuals are seldom completely underground or completely transparent (Johnson et al. 
2000). 
In the second part of the paper we challenge the model’s predictions with empirical 
evidence. We use the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW) to build 
an index of the underground economy based on individual-level data. The index measures the 
level of work irregularity among Italian workers from 1989 to 2006, and ranges from 0 (activity is 
only in the formal sector) to 1 (activity is completely hidden). We regress this index on an 
indicator of financial development and other individual and regional variables. The results show 
that the underground economy is strongly negatively correlated with financial development. We 
find also that more competitive and innovative sectors display lower levels of underground 
activity. Most importantly, in our empirical approach we control for the endogeneity of financial 
development using the indicator proposed by Guiso et al. (2004) (the 1936 Banking Law).  
Our study is not the first to find a negative correlation between financial development and 
the underground economy. Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) use a survey of registered firms in 41 
countries and find that constraint on finance tends to induce informality among small firms but 
not large ones. Also, Beck et al. (2010) find that access to finance has a stronger impact on tax 
evasion for small firms, firms located in small cities, and firms in industries that rely more heavily 
on external finance. La Porta and Shleifer (2008) find that the underground economy is 
negatively associated with the availability of private credit and individuals’ subjective assessment 
of their access to credit. Using cross-country data, Bose et al. (2008) find that bank development 
                                                 
4  
5 See Loyaza (1996), Batra et al. (2003), Farrel (2004), Perry et al. (2009), and Gatti and Honorati (2008).   10
is negatively associated with the size of the underground economy. Ellul et l. (2011) use 
microeconomic data from Worldscope and from the World Bank Enterprise Survey and find that 
investment and access to finance are positively correlated with accounting transparency and 
negatively with tax pressure. They also find that transparency is negatively correlated with tax 
pressure, particularly in sectors where firms are less dependent on external finance, and that 
financial development encourages greater transparency by firms that are more dependent on 
external finance. 
Existing studies do not address this issue and the potential reverse causality argument that a 
large underground economy limits the growth of financial intermediaries.
6 In this paper, we use 
data from a single jurisdiction, and exploit variability in local financial development across Italian 
regions to study the association between financial development and the underground economy. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 describes 
our indicator of irregularity. Descriptive analysis and empirical estimates are presented in Sections 
4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. The Model 
 
We consider an economy with a large number of banks which lend to a continuum of risk 
neutral entrepreneurs, denoted by i. Banks have a positive and exogenous cost of issuing a unit of 
loan,  R R G   , which is the sum of the cost of raising funds, R, and an intermediation cost δ. 
Each entrepreneur is endowed with an illiquid asset, Ai, which is uniformly distributed in the 
interval [0, ] A . The asset (or part of it) can be used as loan collateral. We denote the fraction of 
Ai disclosed to the bank and employed as collateral as γi, with  [0,1] i J ± . Hence, banks observe 
γiAi but not γi or Ai separately. The fraction of the asset that is hidden, (1-γi)Ai, is not observed 
by any other agent or hence by government. 
Each entrepreneur can undertake two types of investment, High-Tech and Low-Tech 
projects (HT and LT, respectively). HT projects are risky, require a loan and operate under a 
technology with constant returns to scale. LT projects do not require a loan but operate with a 
less rewarding, decreasing returns technology. The coexistence within the same industry, of 
                                                 
6 Gatti and Honorati (2008) use Italian regional data and find that financial development is negatively affected by 
indicators of the underground economy.   11
advanced and mature technologies is empirically plausible and can also be justified theoretically. 
One factor that determines the returns of technologies is the dynamics of adoption (Arthur, 
1989). High rates of adoption lead to innovation and further improvements. Hence the rate of 
return depends on technology diffusion. The more the technologies are adopted, the more 
knowledge is gained from their use and the more they are improved upon, a process that 
Rosenberg (1982) describes as “learning by using”. More competition between technologies can 
enhance this process, which is the reason why more dynamic and more competitive sectors tend 
to involve a prevalence of high returns technologies. The opposite applies to mature and stagnant 
technologies where lack of innovation and increasing costs – typically in the price of inputs – lead 
to decreasing returns. 
Following these arguments, we assume that LT projects operate in the underground 
economy and HT projects operate in the formal sector. Indeed, we show that investment in LT 
projects involves tax evasion, while investment in HT projects requires entrepreneurs to reveal 
their revenues. The match between LT and HT projects and the formality of the economy 
accords also with the idea that operations in the underground economy rely on self-financing and 
more traditional projects. Firms engaged in the formal sector, in contrast, rely more heavily on 
external finance and implement more technologically advanced projects. In the remainder of this 
section we study the conditions under which entrepreneurs operate in the formal sector, in the 
underground economy, or in both. Next, we study how financial development affects these 
decisions and the level of investment. 
 
2.1. The two projects 
 
We assume that the LT project does not require a loan, and that it can be carried out using 
the illiquid asset Ai to purchase Low-Tech capital KLT. If entrepreneurs undertake an LT project 
they operate with a decreasing returns to scale technology, according to the following production 
function: 
  LTL T QK
D  )  (1) 
 
LT projects are completely hidden to both lenders and government. Entrepreneurs invest 
in these projects the share of the illiquid asset which is not pledged as collateral. Hence, if γiAi is 
the fraction of the asset disclosed to the bank in order to obtain a loan to finance the HT project, 
the capital invested in the LT project is KLT =(1-γi)Ai.   12
HT projects operate under constant returns to scale. They require a loan Li and deliver 
QHT=QLi units of output with probability p and 0 unit of output with probability (1-p). Each HT 
project has a positive net present value: 
 
ii pQL RL !   
 
There is no information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, and banks can always 
observe whether projects succeed or fail. However, as in Jappelli et al. (2005), we assume that 
only part of the proceeds of the investment can be pledged against the loan. In particular, we 
assume that in case of success lenders can recover at most a fraction θ of output (QLi), and a 
fraction φ of the collateral, with  > @ 0,1 T ±  and  > @ 0,1 I± . The remaining fraction of output (1-θ) 
and collateral (1-φ) can be interpreted as the amount of resources required by the judicial system 
for its functioning. One can think of this loss as the cost of premature liquidation of the 
investment or, alternatively, as the cost of judicial efficiency.
7 Thus, in the case that the project 
succeeds lenders obtain  ii i QL A T MJ  units of output, while in the case of failure they obtain 
ii A MJ . 
We denote by  i R R    the agreed repayment per unit of loan. This repayment is set after 
borrowers supply the collateral  ii A J . In a competitive credit market, banks’ expected profits are 
zero and hence: 
 
  (1 )min[ , ] ii i i i i i RLp R L p R L A MJ      (2) 
 
Depending on the amount of collateral, the zero profit condition (2) determines three possible 
cases. 
A first case (Case A) arises if the collateral is sufficient to repay the lender if the project 
should fail, that is  ii ii AR L MJ  . From equation (1) it is clear that the required interest rate is 
equal to the lowest possible rate; that is, the bank’s cost of supplying the loan is: 
 
  i R R     (3) 
                                                 
7 I.e., if borrowers dispute the claim, lenders can bring the case to court and recover a fraction of the output and 
collateral.   13
 
Only borrowers with large endowments can access this contract. Recalling that  [0,1] i J ±  and 
that the condition ii ii AR L MJ  must be satisfied, to access this contract the collateral required is 
iM a x AA  , with  / Max i AR L M   .  
A second case (Case B) arises if the collateral would be insufficient to repay the lender were 
the project to fail ( ii ii AR L MJ  ). Using equation (1) it is straightforward to show that the 














In this case the interest rate is a decreasing function of the pledged collateral, and greater than in 
case A. 
The third case arises if the amount of the collateral is insufficient to repay the lender even 
were the project to succeed (case C). This occurs if the collateral is insufficient to cover the bank’s 
cost of funding. Let us denote by Amin the level of the endowment, Ai, below which the expected 
return on the project does not cover the cost of funding: 
  min







In this case, potential borrowers with endowments min i AA  are excluded from credit (while 
borrowers with  min i AA   can access the financial contract as in Case B). For simplicity, we rule 
out Case A and focus on a situation in which  Max A A  , that is, no borrower has enough collateral 
to finance a HT project at the interest rate R   (see equation (3)).Thus, we assume that, regardless 
of the disclosed collateral  [0,1] i J ± , all borrowers are financially constrained. 
The problem of financially constrained borrowers is to choose the optimal level of the 
initial asset disclosed to the bank (γiAi). This choice involves a trade-off. The higher the level of 
the pledged collateral γiAi, the lower will be the cost of the loan (see equation(4)) and, in turn, the 
return on the HT project. However, by disclosing the asset, borrowers face two costs: a direct 
cost due to higher taxation, and a higher opportunity cost due to the income loss in operating the 
LT project on a smaller scale. 
   14
2.2. The disclosure choice 
 
The optimal share of disclosed collateral, γi, depends on borrower’s expected utility, which, 
in turn, depends on the available financial contract. We know from the discussion in the previous 
section that by pledging a sufficient level of collateral,  min ii AA J  , borrowers can obtain a loan 
(under the financial contract of case B) and run the HT project. The remaining (and hidden) part 
of the asset can be alternatively invested in the LT project. Therefore, the optimal choice of 
collateral ultimately is a choice between the HT and LT projects. The implication is that if γi =1 
only HT projects are undertaken, if γi =0 that only LT projects are operated, and intermediate 
values of γi indicate investment in both projects. 
We now determine the return on each project and each borrower’s expected utility. We 
denote by t the tax rate levied on the disclosed asset and on the revenues generated by the HT 
project. The expected utility from running the HT project is: 
 
  () ( 1 )[ ( ) ] HTi i i i Eu t p Q R L A J      (6) 
 
The expression states that the project is successful with probability p, and delivers () ii QR L   
units of output. Revenues and the disclosed asset are observed by government and taxed at the 
rate t. In the opposite case, with probability 1–p, the project fails and produces no revenues. Since 
the interest rate is given by equation(4), the expected utility from running the HT project can be 
rewritten as: 
 
  ( ) (1 ) [( ) (1 ) ] HT i i i i i E ut p p Q R Lp A p A MJ J        (7) 
 
The fraction of the asset not disclosed as collateral,  (1 ) LT i i KA J   , is invested in the LT 
project. Since the revenues from LT projects are not observed by government, no taxes are paid, 
and the expected utility is simply: 
 
  () [ ( 1 ) ] LT i i E uA
D J  )   (8) 
 
Combining equations (7) and (8), we obtain the borrower’s expected utility: 
   15
() () () HT LT Eu E u E u     
  (1 ) [( ) (1 ) ] [(1 ) ] ii i i i i i tp p Q RL p A p A A
D MJ J J       )   (9) 
 
The optimal choice is determined maximizing equation (9) with respect to γi. The first order 




(1 ) ii A
D D
J
 ) ⎡ ⎤   ⎢ ⎥ : ⎣ ⎦
, (10) 
where  (1 )[(1 ) ] tp p M :     . This condition defines the optimal γi  as a function of Ai, 
i.e. () ii A JJ   . 
It is straightforward to verify that, other things equal, a higher collateral increases 






. The result depends on the characteristics of the two projects. Borrowers 
choose how much to disclose (γiAi), equating the marginal returns from the HT and LT projects. 
The LT project displays decreasing returns and, hence, there is a unique level of capital 
(1 ) LT i i KA J    that maximizes the project’s return. This implies that borrowers with higher 
levels of asset endowment, Ai, will maximize returns by investing a lower share of the asset, γi, in 
the LT project and, correspondingly, a higher share in the HT project whose return is a linear 
function of the collateral. Hence, it could be argued that disclosure increases with the level of 
assets.
8 
The model shows that the optimal choice of collateral and, correspondingly, the extent to 
which borrowers invest in the LT project and hide their income, depends on the relative returns 
from the two projects. In the next section we study how financial market development (a 
reduction in the cost of credit) affects the relative return and the size of the underground 
economy. We focus below on the effects of improvements in judicial efficiency, tax reforms, and 
changes in the technology of underground activities.  
 
                                                 
8To explain this result, recall that  iL TH T A KK  , where  HTi i K A J  . Since the return on the LT project is 
maximized at a given level of invested capital,  >@
1/(1 ) ˆ (1 ) / LT i i KA
D JD
    ) : , any further increase in Ai will be 
invested in the HT project. Hence, given  ˆ
LT LT KK   , any increase in Ai will raise KHT and imply a higher γi.   16
2.3. Financial development 
 
Financial development is a multifaceted phenomenon. It involves typically the emergence 
of new and thicker capital markets, the introduction of new financial instruments, and greater 
competition between intermediaries. Yet, in general, it is possible to argue that financial 
development entails a lower cost of raising funds. In our model we consider financial 
development as corresponding to a smaller intermediation cost δ and a lower cost of finance, 
R R G   .  
In our model disclosure entails a trade-off. Disclosing collateral reduces the cost of 
accessing external funding, but increases the tax burden. Furthermore, once the collateral is 
disclosed, it cannot be used in the LT sector, which reduces revenues from LT projects. Financial 
development reduces the size of the underground economy only if it relaxes the credit 
constraints, inducing more agents to borrow. Therefore agents with very low-endowment 
( min i AA  ) are not affected by financial development. To see this, recall that their expected utility 
is: 
  () () [ ( 1 ) ] LT i i E uE u A
D J    ) . (11) 
 
The above expression implies that these entrepreneurs set  0 i J   . Hence, any change in the 
cost of credit does not affect their investment decision. Instead, entrepreneurs whose assets are 
above  min A  are able to access the credit market, set  1 i J   and to run both projects. Moreover, 
for these entrepreneurs the choice of collateral is a monotonic and increasing function of their 
endowment, that is, the higher Ai, the higher γi. Figure 1 shows that the disclosure function 
() ii A JJ    is a step function. For  min 0 i A A  , the function coincides with the horizontal axis. 
For  min i A AA , the function is determined by equation (10), and is therefore concave.
9 Since 
we assume that Ai is distributed uniformly over the interval  0,A ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ , the area below the disclosure 
function measures total disclosed assets.  
Let us now see how financial development affects underground activity. We know from 
equation (5) that a reduction in R   reduces the threshold level of collateral  min A  which allows 
borrowers to access credit. Figure 2 shows that also a reduction in R   reduces  min A  to its new 
                                                 















   17
value  min ' A . Borrowers with  min min ' i A AA   who previously were credit constrained and 
operated only in the underground economy, now disclose part of their asset, obtain a loan, and 
run the HT project. The disclosure function  () ii A JJ    shifts accordingly: the concave portion of 
the curve shifts to the right, while the section lying on the horizontal axis shrinks, as does the 
activity in the formal economy. We summarize these results in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 1: Financial development increases the opportunity cost of tax evasion, lowers underground activity, 
reduces credit rationing, and stimulates investment in new technologies. 
 
There are three interesting implications of Proposition 1. The first is that in our framework 
financial development also implies technological improvement; that is, more firms operate HT 
projects. This is in line with the empirical evidence showing that a reduction in the size of the 
underground economy is associated with more efficient use of resources and allocation of 
investments, see e.g. Loyaza (1996) and Farrel (2004) . 
The second implication is that financial market development reduces credit rationing, but 
can never eliminate it even in the best scenario. This depends on our assumption that LT projects 
operate with decreasing returns. For low levels of assets - and, hence, for low levels of KLT - LT 
projects always dominate HT projects. Using equation (10) it is easy to identify the minimum 





D D  ) ⎡ ⎤   ⎢ ⎥ : ⎣ ⎦
 (12) 
As shown in Figure 2 all agents with 0 iL T AA   choose  0 i J    and run only the LT project, 
regardless of the cost of financial intermediation. Thus, financial development can reduce 
underground activity only if  iL T A A ! . 
The third implication is that, given the concavity of  () i A J , financial development reduces 
underground activity at a decreasing rate. To see this, notice that the area below the disclosure 
function  () i A J  in Figure 2, measures the amount of disclosed assets. Since financial development 
reduces the threshold level Amin, disclosed assets expand with financial development at a 
decreasing rate. Hence, entrepreneurs with low endowments invest a relatively higher share of 
their assets in LT projects. More generally, the model implies that the effect of financial 
development on the size of the underground economy is stronger at low levels of financial 
development.   18
 
2.4. Judicial efficiency 
 
As in the cost of financial intermediation, any other factor that affects the relative returns 
from the two projects also affects the choice of collateral and, from equation (10), the choice of 
γi. This implies that an increase in the tax rate t reduces the expected return from HT projects and 
the optimal γi. For the same reasons, an increase in the productivity of LT projects (an increase in 
Φ) raises the profitability of the project and reduces γi. In graphical terms, as t increases and the 
expected return of HT projects falls, the disclosure function  () i A J  shifts downwards. This 
implies that each entrepreneur will disclose a lower share of assets as collateral. Notice that in our 
model, taxation does not affect credit rationing because the tax rate does not enter equation (5) 
and therefore the value of Amin.  
The model also suggests that changes in judicial efficiency may affect γi. To see this, recall 
that we interpret the terms (1 ) HT Q T   and (1 ) i A M   as the amount of resources lost in the case of 
a legal dispute, and that an increase in θ or φ signals a more efficient judicial system. These two 
parameters affect γi in two ways: (i) by reducing credit rationing, and (ii) by changing the relative 
return between HT and LT projects. The first channel operates because a better judicial system 
(an increase in θ or φ) reduces the threshold Amin (see equation (5)) and the region of credit 
rationing. Disclosed assets increase accordingly, and the underground economy shrinks. An 
increase in φ also raises the return on HT relative to LT projects. This increases the incentive to 
disclose assets and to invest in the HT technology.
10 
Figure 3 is a graphical representation of how an improvement in judicial efficiency affects 
γi. The increase in θ or φ (the first channel) reduces Amin to the new value  min ' A . The increase in 
the return of HT projects (the second channel) shifts the  () i A J  function upwards. Hence, the 
new support of the disclosure function is  min [' ,] A A . The size of the underground economy 
shrinks because, in the new equilibrium, entrepreneurs who previously were receiving credit, 
borrow more and disclose more assets, while those who previously were credit rationed obtain 
loans and disclose part of their assets. 
Judicial efficiency also amplifies the impact of financial development on the size of the 
underground economy. Figure 3 illustrates the interaction between financial development and 
judicial efficiency. An improvement in judicial efficiency shifts the disclosure function upwards, 
                                                 
10 This result can be verified by inspecting the first order condition (10).   19
from  () i A J  to the new value  1() i A J . The thresholds  min A and ALT decrease to the new values 
min ' A and  'LT A . Hence, financial development (a reduction in the thresholds  min A  to  min ' A ) has a 
larger impact on the underground economy when the judicial system is efficient. The reason is 
that when the courts are efficient, financial development induces entrepreneurs to disclose a 
larger fraction of their assets, so that the underground economy decreases by a larger amount. 
We summarize the results of this paragraph in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: An improvement in judicial efficiency reduces the size of the underground economy. Judicial 
efficiency also amplifies the impact of financial development on the size of underground economy. 
 
2.5. The technology gap 
 
Empirical evidence shows that the size of the underground economy differs considerably 
across sectors, see Johnson et al. (2000), Batra et al. (2003), Farrel (2004). For instance, in the 
construction industry underground activities are widespread, while the chemicals and drugs 
sectors are comprised mostly of formal enterprises. One of the reasons for this is due to labor 
market regulation, but most of the difference depends on the technologies involved in these 
sectors.  
As we argue above, optimal investment and disclosure policies depend on relative returns 
(and their determinants) from the available technologies. The first order condition (equation (10)) 
shows that a decrease in the return of LT projects (Φ) increases disclosure at each level of Ai. On 
the other hand, a higher return of high tech projects (Q) does not affect investment in HT 
projects directly, but reduces credit rationing by lowering Amin (see equation (5)) and reducing the 
size of the underground economy. Therefore the size of the underground economy in each 
sector depends on the relative returns of investment projects and the degree of credit rationing. 
More dynamic and competitive sectors (e.g. the financial sector, the chemicals industry) tend to 
have higher returns (Q) from their HT projects. Firms in these sectors tend to have lower rates of 
underground activities because they are less likely to be credit constrained. These sectors are 
more competitive, more technologically advanced, and to have a relatively lower technological 
gap between HT and LT technologies. The opposite happens in less dynamic sectors (e.g. 
construction or retail), where new technologies are introduced at slower rates and firms can 
survive despite the implementation of mature technologies.    20
In our model, given the return from HT projects, the parameter Φ measures the 
technological gap between the two projects. A lower Φ indicates a larger gap and therefore is 
typical of less dynamic (backward) sectors while more dynamic (advanced) sectors feature a 
higher Φ. As shown in Figure 4, our model predicts that the impact of financial development is 
larger for backward sectors. Since Φ is lower, the disclosure function of the backward sector, 
()
B
i A J , lies above the disclosure function of the advanced sector,  ()
A
i A J . For the same reason, 
credit rationing in the backward sector is larger (which features min
B A ) than in the advanced sector 
( min
A A ). This implies that in backward sectors the impact of financial development on the size of 
the underground economy is stronger. We summarize the discussion in this paragraph in the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: The size of the underground economy depends on the technological gap between LT and HT 
projects. More mature and less dynamic sectors tend to display higher rates of underground activities. In these 
sectors the impact of financial development on the underground economy is larger. 
 
3. The data  
 
To test the main implications of the model we use two data sets. Our main data come from 
the Bank of Italy’s SHIW. The survey allows us to construct an index of underground activities 
based on microeconomic information. SHIW is a biannual cross-section of about 8,000 
households and 24,000 individuals, and provides detailed information on demographic variables, 
income, consumption, and wealth. Survey data are available from 1977, but the main variable of 
interest for this paper is available only in 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. We exclude 
individuals who do not report years of contributions, are not part of the labor force, or who work 
in the agricultural or public sectors. Our final sample includes 11,781 observations. 
The SHIW is a representative sample of the Italian resident population. The sample design 
is similar to the Labor Force Survey conducted by ISTAT (the Italian national statistics agency).11 
Data are collected through personal interviews. Questions concerning the whole household are 
addressed to the family head or the person most knowledgeable about the family finances; 
                                                 
11 Sampling is carried out in two stages: the first covers the selection of municipalities, the second the selection of 
households. Municipalities are categorized into 51 strata, defined by 17 regions and 3 classes of population size (over 
40,000, 20,000-40,000, less than 20,000). All municipalities in the first group are included; those in the second and 
third groups are selected randomly with a probability proportional to their population size. In the second stage 
households are selected randomly from registry office records.   21
questions about individual incomes are answered by individual household members wherever 
possible. The unit of observation is the family, which is defined to include all persons residing in 
the same dwelling who are related by blood, marriage, or adoption. Individuals selected as 
“partners or other common-law relationships” are also treated as families.  
For obvious reasons, tax evasion and underground activities are difficult to detect and 
measure. Individuals and firms who evade taxes or operate irregularly tend to hide their income 
from the government, and hence, are unlikely to release information on their hidden activities. 
This makes it difficult to obtain direct data on underground activities and is the reason why 
economists have tried different indirect measurement methods, such as the currency demand 
approach, the gap between effective and potential electricity consumption, or the multiple 
indicators approach.
12 These methods are based on macroeconomic estimates of the size of the  
underground economy, and have at least two limitations: (i) they are subject to large 
measurement errors; and (ii) by construction, the resulting indicators of underground activities 
are strongly correlated with other macroeconomic variables. 
We overcome some of these measurement problems by constructing an index of 
underground economy using microeconomic data. Of course, our survey includes no direct 
questions about the extent to which each individual evades in taxes or works irregularly. 
However, we can infer the degree of irregularity and evasion through the following two 
questions, which are posed to each individual interviewed: (1) “How old were you when you started 
working?”  and  “For how many years, or months, did you or your employer not pay, social security 
contributions?”
13 
From these two questions we can construct an index of irregular activities by dividing the 
number of years not covered by social security contributions by the length of the working life. 
There are several advantages to using these questions. First, they are directly related to evasion of 
social security contributions and irregular work, among the main signs of underground activity. 
Second, while respondents are unlikely to reply to direct questions about their jobs, they may be 
more inclined to report indirect information on contributions towards their pensions. Third, 
since our objective is to study the relation between the underground economy and financial 
development, it is straightforward to merge our index of irregular work with the index of 
                                                 
12 According to this approach, a country’s shadow economy is treated as a latent variable which is then imputed 
using several “indicators” and “cause” variables. This method provides the widest country coverage and therefore is 
used extensively in the macroeconomic literature, see Djankov et al. (2002), Loyayza et al., (2005) and La Porta and 
Shleifer (2008). 
13 The social security contribution rate is 33% of the gross wage for private and public employees and 20% in the 
case of self-employment.   22
financial development proposed by Guiso et al. (2004), which is estimated using the same data. 
Finally, and most importantly, our analysis exploits regional variability in the level of financial 
development in a single country. By focusing on the same jurisdiction, we overcome the problem 
that a relation between underground economy and financial development arises because both 
variables are correlated with other institutional and macroeconomic indicators. 
However, our indicator also has some drawbacks As with many microeconomic variables, 
an obvious source of concern is misreporting and recall bias. Another concern is that years not 
covered by social contribution might be years of unemployment rather than years of irregular 
work. For this reason, in our estimates we control for the local unemployment rate and per capita 
GDP at the provincial level. 
As already mentioned, the SHIW provides also an indicator of local financial development. 
This indicator, proposed by Guiso et al. (2004), measures the probability that households have 
access to credit, that is, that they are not credit constrained. The SHIW asks households to report 
whether, in the 12 months before the interview, they have been denied credit or did not apply for 
credit because they thought they would be turned down. Based on this information, and 
controlling for other relevant variables, Guiso et al. (2004) estimate the probability that a 
potential borrower is turned down for credit or discouraged from borrowing, controlling for a 
wide range of individual and regional variables. The regional dummies obtained from the 
regression model are then normalized to be equal to zero in the region with the maximum value 
of the coefficient of the regional dummy (Calabria is the least financially developed region), and 
therefore varies between zero and 1 (the highest value is 0.58). 
Our analysis of the relation between financial development and the underground economy 
needs to address the issue of potential reverse causality and endogeneity of financial 
development. In particular, an increase in underground activities (e.g. due to an increase in 
general taxation) reduces the demand for credit, hampering financial market growth. Similarly, 
low GDP growth might reduce the demand for loans and financial development, while at the 
same time increasing underground activities. This implies that simply observing that low financial 
development is associated with a high level of underground activities does not necessarily mean 
that low financial development actually causes more underground activities. 
Guiso et al. (2004) identify a plausible instrument to address the endogeneity problem. 
They focus on the 1936 Banking Law, which over time has constrained the growth of the Italian 
banking system and is an exogenous determinant of the trajectories of local financial 
development. Following a period of frequent banking crises, in 1936 Italian legislators attempted   23
to stabilize the financial system by strictly limiting in each region the number of banks and bank 
branches. In achieving this aim, the law has worked very well, as witnessed by the fact that the 
number of new branches in Italy after 1936 has expanded very little. Yet, in some regions and for 
some local credit institutions (such as savings banks and cooperative banks) the 1936 Banking 
Law has been less constraining. Therefore the 1936 Law explains a large part of the variability in 
local financial development even 60 years on. Guiso et al. (2004) test this hypothesis by 
estimating the correlation between the index of regional financial development and the 
characteristics of the banking system before the 1936 Law. They find that 1936 bank branches, 
local branches, saving banks and cooperative banks (each in per capita terms) explain 72% of the 
regional variation in credit supply in the 1990s. In our empirical estimates we use the same 
instruments to control for endogeneity in financial development. 
 
 
4. Descriptive analysis 
 
Our microeconomic indicator of irregular activities is consistent with macroeconomic 
estimates from different sources. Figure 5 plots the regional averages of the index of job 
irregularity against a similar index, produced by ISTAT but based on the Labor Force Survey. 
Despite the very different methods of elicitation, a strong correlation between the two measures 
is evident (the correlation coefficient is 0.87). Both indicators show that Southern regions feature 
the highest levels of underground economy. In particular, in Campania, Sicily, Sardinia, and other 
Southern regions the irregular job rate exceeds 30% or even 40%, about twice as high as the level 
of irregularity in Northern regions such as Friuli and Emilia-Romagna. The South is also much 
less developed in terms of per capita GDP, infrastructure, and human capital. It is characterized 
by more corruption, less efficient government, and higher levels of organized crime. Each of 
these factors potentially contributes to generating a large underground economy. Yet these 
regions also display relatively low levels of financial development, and we argue that this channel 
plays an important role in shaping the underground economy. 
Figure 6 plots the relation between financial development and the size of the underground 
economy. We use regional averages for the period 1995-2004. The correlation is strongly negative 
(-0.81) and statistically different from zero at the 1% level. Figure 6 shows a strong geographical 
divide. For example, in Campania a high irregular job rate (44%) is coupled with an index of   24
financial development of only 3%. In contrast, Lombardy (the richest region in the North) has a 
much lower irregular job rate (21%) but a much higher index of financial development (43%).  
In Italy, as in many other countries, there are significant differences by sector in the level of 
underground activity. Figure 7 shows that the index of job irregularity reaches 30.8% in the 
construction sector, 25% in the retail and tourism sectors, but is much lower (12% and 15% 
respectively) in the financial and manufacturing sectors. These differences clearly reflect 
structural and technological differences between sectors. Underground activities are more 
widespread in low value added sectors with relatively low competition and smaller firm sizes. 
Note that this is one of the predictions of the model, because firms operating in more mature 
sectors have fewer incentives to invest and lower opportunity costs of hiding revenue. 
Descriptive statistics show also that the size of the underground economy depends on the 
nature of employment. Self-employed, professionals, and entrepreneurs are much more likely to 
work in the underground economy (the index of job irregularity in these occupations ranges from 
24% for self-employed to 26% for professionals and entrepreneurs). For managers (8%), and 
clerks (12%) irregular activities are much less widespread. One reason for this is that, in Italy, 
employers deduct the tax before transferring wages to employees. This implies that it is much 
more difficult for employees to evade taxes and social contributions. Therefore hidden activities 
arise from extra work not supported by a formal employment contract. In the next section we 
present regressions for the relation between local financial development and the underground 
economy, controlling for possible sources of endogeneity and other factors (such as sector and 
occupation) which might influence the relationship.  
 
 
5. Regression evidence 
 
In our empirical estimates we regress the irregular job rate on the indicator of local 
financial development and a set of individual variables (gender, age, years of education, marital 
status, disposable income). Each regression also includes time dummies; some of the 
specifications include occupation or/and sector dummies. We also include an indicator to control 
for judicial inefficiency, using ISTAT data. This indicator measures the length of ordinary civil 
trials, that is, the time elapsing from the date of the initial recording of a trial to the sentence, for 
actions requiring adjudication of substantive rights concerning credit and commercial matters 
such as loans, sale of real estate or goods, rentals, negotiable and quasi-negotiable instruments,   25
and insurance.
14 The enforcement cost is directly related to the length of the judicial process. A 
long trial increases the legal expenses and, for disputed loans, the interest income that is forgone 
when the collateral does not cover the judicial costs. Moreover, during the time of the trial, the 
creditor is exposed to the danger of asset substitution by the debtor and to unexpected changes 
in the value of collateral. Therefore we expect that judicial inefficiency is associated with more 
underground activities.  
We start our analysis by presenting the OLS regressions. Since some of the right-hand side 
variables vary only between provinces or regions (judicial inefficiency, local unemployment rate, 
financial market development), standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the provincial level. 
Table 2, column 1 presents our baseline model. The demographic variables explain a substantial 
part of the variability of the irregular job rate. In particular, we find that women and younger 
individuals with lower levels of education are more likely to work irregularly, while higher 
disposable income increases the likelihood of operating in the formal sector. 
The main variable of interest is financial development. The coefficient of this variable is 
negative and statistically different from zero at the 1% level, which is consistent with the model’s 
prediction. Its impact is sizable: raising financial development by 10 percentage points 
(approximately the distance between Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna) reduces the irregular job rate 
by 2.2 percentage points. Lower judicial efficiency is associated with a higher rate of irregular 
working (the coefficient is 0.083 and is statistically different from zero at the 1% level). Note that 
the model in Section 2 suggests that judicial efficiency may affect the size of the underground 
economy both directly, and indirectly through financial development. Directly, judicial efficiency 
reduces the size of the underground economy by increasing the opportunity cost of hiding 
income. Indirectly, an improvement in judicial efficiency increases the value of collateral and 
reduces the cost of credit. Therefore, the effect of judicial efficiency is captured partly by the 
index of local financial development. 
In Table 2, column 2 we add to the baseline model a dummy for the South and an indicator 
of social capital (fraction of the population participating in general elections in each province).
15 
The coefficients of both variables are positive, but only the dummy for the South is statistically 
different from zero. Since Southern regions tend also to be the least financially developed and 
feature the highest judicial inefficiency, introducing this dummy attenuates the impact of financial 
                                                 
14 A narrower classification of legal action (e.g., loans only) produces too few observations for each district-year cell 
to compute reliable indicators of judicial inefficiency. For the same reason we do not consider the length of appeals 
in civil cases and bankruptcy procedures.  
15 Other common proxies for social capital (e.g., non profit organizations) deliver qualitatively similar results.   26
development (coefficient is -0.184) and judicial inefficiency (0.038). Furthermore, while the 
coefficient of financial development is still statistically different from zero at the 1% level, the 
effect of judicial inefficiency is now less precisely estimated than in the regression in column 1. 
The third specification in Table 2 repeats the estimation introducing sector and occupation 
dummies, and the results are essentially unaffected. The final specification in Table 2, column 4 
adds the provincial unemployment rate to control for the fact that some of the irregular work 
might be due to spells of unemployment. The coefficient of this indicator is not statistically 
different from zero, and again the other coefficients are unaffected. Other regressions with 
indicators of local labor markets conditions (such as provincial GDP per capita) and other 
regional or provincial variables (e.g. crime rates) provide similar results. 
The next step is to tackle the issue of the potential endogeneity of financial development. 
In Table 3 we repeat the estimations using the same instruments as in Guiso et al (2004): number 
of branches per capita in 1936, number of local branches in 1936, number of saving banks per 
capita in 1936, and number of cooperative banks per capita in 1936. These variable pass standard 
tests of validity of the instruments.
16 The IV regressions confirm the OLS results. Financial 
development negatively and significantly affects the level of the underground economy, and the 
results are robust under the different specifications. With the exception of the regression in 
column 1, the coefficient sizes are quite similar to those in the regressions in Table 2.  
The mechanism behind our theoretical model is that firms have an incentive to move from 
low return technologies (LT projects) to more innovative technologies (HT projects). This shift 
in production occurs through credit markets, pledging more resources, and emerging into the 
formal sector. Technological gaps between LT and HT projects therefore are crucial for shaping 
the incentives to operate in the formal economy or underground. Since these gaps depend on the 
specificity of the production process, we want to check whether the effect of financial 
development is disproportionate in some sectors. We are especially interested in testing the 
prediction of the model that in mature sectors the impact of financial development on the 
underground economy is larger (Proposition 3). 
Tables 4 and 5 respectively present the OLS and IV regressions by sector. Figure 7 showed 
that the underground economy is much more widespread in the construction, retail, and 
transportation sectors. Our regression estimates show that it is precisely in these sectors that 
                                                 
16 The F-test on the first-stage instruments indicates that the instruments are a significant predictor of financial 
development. The Sargan test does not reject the hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid. Except for the 
regression in column 1, the Wooldridge's (1995) robust score test does not reject the hypothesis that the variables are 
exogenous.     27
financial development has the strongest negative impact on the irregular job rate, regardless of 
the estimation method. In particular, in the OLS regressions the coefficient of financial 
development is -0.353 for the construction sector, -0.287 for retail and tourism, and -0.198 for 
transportation, as opposed to -0.076 and -0.131 in the financial and manufacturing sectors, 
respectively. The other coefficients are broadly in line with the full sample estimates. Higher 
education and higher disposable income are generally associated with a lower rate of irregularity. 
The coefficients of the South dummy and of the indicator of judicial inefficiency are generally 
positive, but statistically different from zero only in the regressions for the financial sector (the 
dummy for South is also significant in the regressions for manufacturing). As in the full sample 
estimates, the IV estimates pass the standard tests of validity of instruments (except for the 
exogeneity test in the financial and real estate sectors). 




The existence of a large underground economy represents a relevant burden on society. 
The underground economy can slow the investment rate, reduce the adoption of new 
technologies, and limit the ability of governments to raise sufficient resources to pay for public 
goods and for infrastructure. Eventually, it can affect the allocation of real resources and thwart 
economic growth. A high level of taxation, cumbersome and inefficient bureaucracy, and poor 
legal protection are among the factors that have been identified as the major causes of tax 
evasion and a large underground economy. In this paper we focus on financial development, a 
factor that has received less attention from economists. 
The main idea is that when individuals and firms hide all or part of their income, the pay 
less tax, but they also face a higher cost of credit. Therefore, the choice of operating in the 
underground economy involves a trade-off. By reducing the cost of credit or by granting credit to 
previously credit constrained agents, financial development affects the trade-off, increasing the 
incentive to operate in the formal economy. We capture these ideas in a simple model in which 
agents choose to disclose their collateral in order to obtain credit for investment in a high-return 
project. The alternative is to operate in the informal sector in a low-return project using only 
internal funds. The choice to go underground therefore is also a choice between different 
technologies. The model predicts that financial development (a reduction in the cost of credit) 
induces firms to disclose more assets and to invest in a high-tech project, and that this effect is   28
stronger in mature sectors. Furthermore, an improvement in judicial efficiency reduces the cost 
of credit and the size of the underground economy.  
In the second part of the paper we test the main implications of the model using Italian 
microeconomic data. We build an index of job irregularity using the 1995-2004 Bank of Italy 
SHIW, and regress this index on an indicator of local financial development, judicial inefficiency, 
and other individual and regional variables. The results show that the underground economy is 
strongly negatively correlated with financial development, even when we control for financial 
development endogeneity. We find also that more competitive and innovative sectors display a 
lower level of underground activity, and that financial development has a stronger impact in 
mature sectors (such as construction, retail, tourism). The effect of judicial inefficiency is in line 
with the model’s predictions, but the coefficient is not statistically different from zero if we 
control for other regional variables. 
Our study implies that successful programs to reduce the extent of the underground 
economy should take into account the structure of credit markets, and implies also that financial 
market development has important spillover effects. By reducing the incentives to operate in the 
underground economy, financial market development can stimulate the adoption of new 
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Figure 7 
Irregular job rate, by sector 
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Variable Mean  Median  Standard  deviation 
 
      
Index of underground activity  0.2038  0.0870  0.2735 
Financial development 0.3689 0.4350  0.1753 
Male 0.8523  1.0000  0.3548 
Age 44.0546  44.0000  9.7390 
Education 3.4128  3.0000  0.8801 
Married 0.8041  1.0000  0.3969 
Log disposable income  10.3357  10.3482  0.6222 
Judicial inefficiency  1.2315  1.1494  0.2494 
Social capital  0.8144  0.8378  0.0803 
South 0.2401  0.0000  0.4271 
Provincial unemployment rate  0.1078  0.0847  0.0684 
      
Manufacturing   0.3988  0.0000  0.4897 
Construction 0.1280  0.0000  0.3341 
Retail and tourism  0.2414  0.0000  0.4280 
Transportation 0.0766  0.0000  0.2659 
Financial sector 0.0651  0.0000  0.2467 
Real estate  0.0901  0.0000  0.2864 
      
Operative 0.3770  0.0000  0.4846 
Clerk 0.1985  0.0000  0.3989 
Manager 0.0748  0.0000  0.2632 
Professional 0.0722  0.0000  0.2588 
Entrepreneur 0.0287  0.0000  0.1670 
Self-employed  0.3770  0.0000  0.4846 
     
Number of observations  11781     
 
Note. Data are drawn from the 1995-2004 SHIW. Sample statistics refer to the pooled sample. 
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Table 2 





(2) (3) (4) 
Financial development  -0.223  -0.184 -0.189 -0.186 
 (0.037)***  (0.058)***  (0.056)*** (0.055)*** 
Male  -0.034  -0.035 -0.043 -0.044 
 (0.012)***  (0.012)***  (0.012)*** (0.012)*** 
Age  -0.022  -0.022 -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Age square  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Years of education  -0.020  -0.020 -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.007)***  (0.007)***  (0.008)** (0.008)** 
Married  -0.026  -0.030 -0.024 -0.023 
 (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.009)*** (0.009)** 
Log disposable income  -0.079  -0.076  -0.075  -0.075 
 (0.008)***  (0.008)***  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
Judicial  inefficiency  0.083  0.038 0.014 0.007 
 (0.026)***  (0.028)  (0.031) (0.038) 
Social  capital    0.093 0.069 0.085 
    (0.127) (0.130) (0.149) 
South    0.069 0.059 0.053 
   (0.023)***  (0.022)**  (0.024)** 
Provincial unemployment rate        0.085 
       (0.215) 
Constant  1.606  1.518 1.584 1.582 
 (0.121)***  (0.145)***  (0.179)*** (0.187)*** 
       
Year  dummies  YES  YES YES YES 
Sector dummies  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Occupation dummies  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Observations  11781  11781 11779 11673 
R-squared  0.12  0.13 0.17 0.17 
 
Note. The sample refers to the 1995-2004 SHIW. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the provincial level, are 
reported in parenthesis. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3 





(2) (3) (4) 
Financial development  -0.311 -0.179 -0.187 -0.189 
 (0.050)***  (0.059)***  (0.056)*** (0.055)*** 
Male  -0.036 -0.034 -0.043 -0.044 
 (0.012)***  (0.012)***  (0.012)*** (0.012)*** 
Age  -0.022 -0.021 -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Age square  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Years of education  -0.020 -0.020 -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.007)***  (0.007)***  (0.008)** (0.008)** 
Married  -0.027 -0.030 -0.024 -0.023 
 (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.009)*** (0.009)** 
Log disposable income  -0.077  -0.076  -0.075  -0.075 
 (0.008)***  (0.008)***  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
Judicial  inefficiency  0.043 0.039 0.014 0.007 
  (0.031) (0.028) (0.030) (0.037) 
Social capital    0.090  0.067  0.086 
   (0.128)  (0.132)  (0.149) 
South   0.070  0.059  0.053 
   (0.023)***  (0.022)***  (0.024)** 
Provincial unemployment rate        0.082 
       (0.216) 
Constant  1.672 1.518 1.592 1.575 
 (0.124)***  (0.144)***  (0.175)*** (0.187)*** 
      
Year  dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Sector dummies  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Occupation dummies  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Observations  11781 11781 11779 11673 
F-test on first-stage instruments  29.91 47.01 47.35 70.50 
Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value)  0.54 0.78 0.66 0.42 
Exogeneity test (p-value)  0.02 0.78 0.90 0.87 
 
Note. The sample refers to the 1995-2004 SHIW. The instruments are: branches per capita in 1936, local branches in 
1936, number of saving banks per capita in 1936, and number of cooperative banks per capita in 1936. Standard 
errors, adjusted for clustering at the provincial level, are reported in parenthesis. * significant at the 10% level, ** 
significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4 


















Financial development  -0.076 -0.353 -0.287 -0.198 -0.131 
 (0.039)*  (0.076)***  (0.088)*** (0.056)***  (0.058)** 
Male -0.044  -0.001  -0.025 -0.012 -0.064 
 (0.013)***  (0.077)  (0.018) (0.030)  (0.023)*** 
Age  -0.023 -0.026 -0.014 -0.016 -0.017 
 (0.005)***  (0.007)***  (0.006)** (0.011)  (0.009)* 
Age square  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)** (0.000)  (0.000) 
Years of education  -0.024  -0.032 -0.027 -0.049 -0.003 
 (0.007)***  (0.013)**  (0.011)** (0.014)***  (0.011) 
Married -0.008  -0.030  -0.029 -0.047 -0.065 
 (0.011)  (0.029)  (0.018) (0.031)  (0.021)*** 
Log disposable income  -0.074 -0.120 -0.063 -0.054 -0.053 
  (0.009)*** (0.016)*** (0.011)*** (0.021)** (0.017)*** 
Judicial inefficiency  0.017 -0.071 0.018 0.072 0.099 
 (0.025)  (0.066)  (0.048) (0.065)  (0.048)** 
Social capital  0.005  -0.089 0.076 0.252 0.203 
 (0.102)  (0.194)  (0.255) (0.213) (0.223) 
South 0.083  0.034  0.046 0.030 0.041 
 (0.025)***  (0.036)  (0.037) (0.033) (0.032) 
Constant 1.514  2.506 1.362 1.174 1.020 
  (0.137)*** (0.355)*** (0.301)*** (0.362)*** (0.266)*** 
       
Year  dummies  YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations  4783 1482 2779  899  1951 
R-squared  0.13 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.13 
 
Note. The sample refers to the 1995-2004 SHIW. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the provincial level, are 
reported in parenthesis. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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 Table 5 




















Financial development  -0.103 -0.353 -0.274 -0.209 -0.001 
 (0.043)**  (0.076)***  (0.087)*** (0.062)***  (0.104) 
Male -0.044  -0.001  -0.025 -0.012 -0.050 
 (0.013)***  (0.076)  (0.018) (0.030)  (0.028)* 
Age  -0.023 -0.026 -0.014 -0.016 -0.020 
 (0.005)***  (0.007)***  (0.006)** (0.011) (0.009)** 
Age square  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)** 
Years of education  -0.024 -0.032 -0.027 -0.049 0.016 
 (0.007)***  (0.013)**  (0.011)** (0.014)***  (0.013) 
Married -0.008  -0.030  -0.029 -0.047 -0.052 
 (0.011)  (0.029)  (0.017)* (0.030)  (0.023)** 
Log disposable income  -0.074 -0.120 -0.063 -0.054 -0.056 
  (0.009)*** (0.016)*** (0.011)*** (0.021)*** (0.019)*** 
Judicial inefficiency  0.012 -0.071 0.021 0.069 0.119 
 (0.026)  (0.065)  (0.047) (0.067)  (0.056)** 
Social capital  0.027  -0.089 0.068 0.257 0.207 
 (0.108)  (0.191)  (0.256) (0.214) (0.274) 
South 0.081  0.034  0.047 0.029 0.064 
 (0.024)***  (0.036)  (0.037) (0.033) (0.047) 
Constant 1.511  2.506 1.359 1.177 0.975 
  (0.136)*** (0.352)*** (0.299)*** (0.361)*** (0.281)*** 
       
Year  dummies  YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations  4783 1482 2779  899  1836 
F-test on first-stage instruments 56.31  38.03  55.30 45.80 37.89 
Test of over-ident. restrictions  (p-value)  0.97 0.73 0.58 0.75 0.31 
Exogeneity test (p-value) 0.15  0.98  0.57 0.72 0.01 
 
Note. The sample refers to the 1995-2004 SHIW. The instruments are: branches per capita in 1936, local branches in 
1936, number of saving banks per capita in 1936, and number of cooperative banks per capita in 1936. Standard 
errors, adjusted for clustering at the provincial level, are reported in parenthesis. * significant at the 10% level, ** 
significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
 